The Supreme Court has  clarified the scope and applicability of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, particularly in relation to the passing of awards, the appellate framework before High Courts, and the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court held that Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act applies to all cases where the award is passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, irrespective of the date on which the acquisition proceedings were initiated. The Court held that in such cases, the award must be made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. However, it was clarified that while the determination of compensation must follow the 2013 regime, the provisions relating to rehabilitation and resettlement would not automatically apply unless otherwise stipulated.

The Supreme Court clarifying the appellate mechanism, ruled that first appeals filed before the High Courts against awards passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act are required to be treated as appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, and not under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court also held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, delay in filing appeals under the 2013 Act can be condoned upon sufficient cause being shown. The Court observed that there is no express bar under the 2013 Act against the application of the Limitation Act.

Reiterating the mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Court held that exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Sections 4 to 24, can arise only through express statutory exclusion. Express exclusion is the general rule, while implied exclusion operates only as an exception, depending upon the nature and scheme of the concerned legislation. The burden to establish implied exclusion, the Court emphasised, lies heavily on the party asserting it.

The Court further clarified that mere incorporation of a specific period of limitation under a special or local law does not amount to express exclusion of the Limitation Act. For such exclusion to operate, the statute must clearly indicate that the provisions of the Limitation Act are inapplicable.

Emphasising settled principles of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court cautioned that interpretation of words or provisions must be made contextually with reference to the statute in which they occur. Importing interpretations from other enactments, the Court observed, could lead to dangerous consequences. Any interpretation that has the effect of destroying a right to seek adjudication on merits must be avoided unless such exclusion is apparent on the face of the statute.

The Court further held that where two interpretations are possible, the interpretation that facilitates access to appellate remedies must be preferred. Ignoring a legislative provision while interpreting a statute would, the Court warned, amount to rendering the provision otiose, which is impermissible even in the absence of a formal challenge.